20c • NOVEMBER 30, 1953

New Republic

The Trial of Harry Truman

- *Was the Truman Administration "Blind?"*
- *How Broad Was Soviet Espionage?*
- *Was the Espionage "Known" in 1946?*
- *What Did the Truman Administration Do?*
- *Has Brownell Undermined Our Liberties?*

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T. R. B. *Washington Wire*

Herbert Brownell wants to fight espionage by legalizing wire-tapping and watering down the Fifth Amendment. He will demand legislation when Congress meets. Let there be no doubt where this column stands on the Brownell proposals, weak though they are: we're for them. We have long felt that subversives were sheltering in the Constitution, traitors hiding in the Flag. We back the Brownell proposals (timid though they be); we also advocate revival of torture in espionage (and related) trials, to facilitate confessions. How else can the FBI complete its job? Indeed, Brownell's half-way measures strike us as suspicious; is he, too, coddling Communism? Let's put our heart into this Crusade! Let's install thumbscrews at police stations, put lead wires from all home telephones to Washington and declare a five-year holiday on the Bill of Rights. Then we'll really get those damn Reds.

When Brownell presented his testimony in the Harry Dexter White case to the Senate Subcommittee he knew that he was doing two things. He was omitting two crucial sentences from the February 1, 1946, FBI report on White that put Truman's action in quite a different light, and he was also breaking confidence with a friendly foreign nation, Canada, by publishing a secret FBI letter dragging Canada into the mess. These were reckless things to do but the political need was great. Truman's ferocious speech had to be answered and crushed. Brownell was willing to set a precedent of making *ex parte* use of secret police files for his purpose. His unparalleled action shocked the democratic world but temporarily strengthened his case.

The FBI sentences Brownell omitted were a frank admission by J. Edgar Hoover in his 28-page report to Truman on White of February 1, 1946, that he didn't have the evidence to convict White and that he couldn't get such evidence insofar as past offenses went. In other words, the only hope of trapping White was to keep on watching him. Mr. Truman may have been wrong in 1946 in continuing White in office under surveillance, but it was these sentences, written by J. Edgar Hoover, that did it.

Those sentences have never been published. Brownell has them. He was aware of them when he declared under oath he was giving all "the essential facts." He was aware of them when he implied—to a question of Sen. John McClellan (D, Ark.)—that the failure to convict White was due to inadmissibility of wire-tap evidence, whereas actually the Hoover sentences raised broader problems. Washington newsmen have appealed to Eisenhower to arrange a press conference with Brownell but the latter is strangely shy.

The Canadian matter, coupled with Senate committee efforts to summon Igor Gouzenko, ex-Soviet cipher clerk in Ottawa who tipped off atomic espionage in 1945, naturally strain relations with our neighbor. The orthodox feeling is to deplore this. We cannot agree. When frock-coated statesmen slap their chests over the absence of forts on the international border we always enter a private dissent. The nature of nations being what it is, friendly countries never learn much from each other. The country that is influencing America's culture and thinking least today for its size is Canada.

By contrast, enemy lands cannot study each other enough. In Britain, the greatest civilizing influence for three centuries was hostile France. By contrast today, no American gives two hoots what Canada thinks about anything.

We live beside and ignore a country that doesn't have nightmares over "socialism," has a responsible party system with parliamentary government, prefers to check espionage with a Royal Commission rather than McCarthy, holds the balance between decency and commercialism on radio, balances its budget and maintains its global dignity. All these lessons are lost for the US, because we take Canadian cordiality for granted and look South, East and West but never North. By all means, let's have some forts on the border.

When Brownell and Hoover testified last week we counted 13 motion picture and television cameras on tripods, plus two other tripods for still shots. It was an oil derrick forest in miniature. There were six tall iron stands for blazing sun lamps. On the table before the witnesses were 15 separate microphones and two separate glasses of ice water.

Attorney General Brownell is a short, oddly insignificant figure with sparse sandy hair.

J. Edgar Hoover is a different type. He is thick and burly, broad-shouldered and wears the dark-blue business suit that is the unofficial FBI uniform. His wavy black hair was sleeked down with glistening dressing, and there was the beginning of a fleshy roll at the back of his neck.

The Senate committee showed deference amounting to awe. The Senators were afraid of the cop. And Hoover, head of the internal security police, was taking part for the first time in a partisan political quarrel. The kid-gloved claque applauded. It was not a cool, neutral, dispassionate account from an objective civil servant but one that hinted at deep emotional resentment at Democratic years. Repeatedly Hoover said that the FBI "did not evaluate," and again and again he evaluated. He convicted White without hesitation and denied that the FBI in 1946 had approved keeping White in office, which President Truman had not charged. He departed amidst an ovation.

Poor old Ike is the forgotten man in all this—breathing pious hopes that Communism won't be an election issue. He left it to the 179 reporters at his press conference last week whether his Administration had embraced "McCarthyism." The *New York Times* polled 80 of them afterwards. Their verdict: Ike hadn't, but his Administration had.

What's the difference between Brownellism and McCarthyism? The first is cellophane-wrapped; the second is scooped out loose. McCarthy is the wild dog leading the pack, Brownell is the Master of Hounds, blowing his horn. In short, the results are the same, but Brownellism is McCarthyism from a Madison Avenue church pew.

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Noteworthy This Week

BEHIND THE HEADLINES

Central Valley

THE STATE of California is dickering with Secretary of Interior Douglas McKay for purchase of the Central Valley Project. What seems to be at issue in these discussions is the magnitude of the giveaway and the degree to which federal anti-land-monopoly and public-power-priority regulations are to be nullified.

California's Central Valley is one of the world's most fertile. But although the Southern two-thirds enjoys a 365 day-a-year growing season, only one-third of the available water reaches it. So, California devised a master plan for carrying the northern surplus of water southward. Unable to finance the vast scheme, it appealed to Washington. And the federal government agreed to undertake the most complex water-development program known to man. One-fourth of the master plan has been completed at a cost of nearly $500 million. The state, its people, the federal government have all long agreed that the entire project must be realized. It will cost another $1.5 billion.

Built by the federal government, the project comes under federal laws requiring that public bodies be given priority in the sale of power, and limiting the supply of water for irrigation to family-size farms.

Two powerful interests found these regulations oppressive; beginning in 1943, the large landholders and the Pacific Gas and Electric Co. set up a clamor for state purchase. The then Secretary of Interior Harold Ickes declared himself in favor of the idea if California would agree to reimburse the federal government for its expenses, retain the regulations on public priority and acreage limitation, and complete the master plan as originally agreed. The clamor subsided.

It began again after last year's Republican victory. And negotiations for the sale have begun. The Californian's, however, do not offer to pay $500 million for the project. And McKay is "exploring" ways by which the price can be lowered below one-half that amount. Nor is McKay being stuffy about completion of the project. The plan seems to be (1) a cut-rate sale of what has been finished, (2) federal "participation" in the construction of what has not, and (3) another cut-rate sale. In the meantime, California newspapers suggest that the state will finance the purchase through an arrangement with the PG&E.

Any agreement between McKay and California will require the approval of Congress. If approved, it would become a model. Other states, landowners and private power companies would plead discrimination unless equally liberal grants were channelled their way. A pattern and a precedent would be provided for those who wish to get rid of TVA. Among the prominent members of the Administration who share this desire is McKay who, reports AP, recently said "he is opposed to the government's policy of supporting such projects like the TVA."

Talmadge's Last Stand

GOVERNOR Herman Talmadge has notified the world that as long as he remains in office "there will be no mixed schools and colleges in Georgia." That will be true, he said, even in the "calamitous event" of a Supreme Court decision holding segregated public schools to be unconstitutional and ordering either immediate or gradual integration.



Ivory Tower

Since Talmadge's term as Governor has but a year to run and since he is ineligible to succeed himself, this threatened affront to the authority of the Supreme Court may be something less than eternal. But at the current session of the Georgia legislature he has set in motion forces which can complicate and prolong the transition period following any judicial outlawing of segregated schools. He has asked the legislature to prepare an amendment to the state constitution, subject to ratification by the voters in 1954, permitting the abolition of the state's public schools and authorizing the establishment and statewide support of so-called private, segregated schools. A companion request is that a commission be created to study the forthcoming Supreme Court decision and to draft legislation necessary "to maintain separate education of the white and colored races under all circumstances."

There are serious doubts whether any such efforts to circumvent a constitutional interpretation by the Supreme Court can ultimately succeed. In the past the Court has been disposed to disregard and override disingenuous schemes to deprive individuals of their established constitutional rights, and there is little reason to believe that the Court would not be able to see through the transparent private veil which Talmadge would throw around the public-school system of Georgia.

In the meantime, the Supreme Court is preparing to hear oral arguments on the momentous constitutional issue on December 7. Briefs have recently been submitted on behalf of the parents of Negro school children who were excluded from white schools, charging that segregated schooling cannot be upheld "without a clear determination that Negroes are inferior, and therefore must be segregated from other human beings."

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End of the Line for Governor Dewey

DEWEY

IN NEW YORK Republicans no longer buy Thomas E. Dewey's self-estimate of his superior virtue and piety. In this state, at least, he seems to have reached the end of the line. For a Republican legislator to have questioned a Dewey edict only a few years ago would have been to invite political suicide. Last week the entire Republican majority of the state Senate felt it could with impunity brush aside Dewey's demand that it strip Acting Lieutenant-Governor Arthur H. Wicks of his leadership posts.

Despite Dewey's lofty tone in summoning a special session of the Legislature to act on Wicks' visits to convicted extortionist Joey Fay at Sing Sing, New York's No. 2 man was allowed by his colleagues to resign as majority leader of the Senate on his own terms and in his own time.

The legislators did not bother even to censure Wicks. The unexpected Republican show of independence did not reflect a return to basic principles of the separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches, as some may have thought. There has not been a more submissive group of legislators anywhere in the country than the New York Republicans. It was simply a revolt against a hypocritical attempt to make Wicks the scapegoat for the "mess in Albany." His fellow-legislators, in effect, told Dewey, "We've always known what kind of a boy Arthur was. Why get on a high-horse about it now?"

Dewey, of course, has long known of Wicks' strange associates. He had only to read the newspapers which recounted in detail Wicks' intervention in the case of Tommy (Three-Finger Brown) Luchese, the reputed interim boss of the New York underworld while Frank Costello was in jail. Wicks admitted without blushing that he had gone to the State Parole Board to help Luchese get a good conduct certificate, which restored his citizenship rights. Had Dewey been alarmed at the decline of political morals in Albany, that would have been the time to dissociate himself from Wicks. Instead Wicks continued as Dewey's spokesman in the state Senate, responsible for pushing through the Governor's annual legislative program.

The storm broke around Wicks during the New York municipal election campaign in the aftermath of the murder of Thomas F. Lewis, an obscure labor racketeer at the hoodlum-infested Yonkers Raceway. For a time there was a scandal-a-day breaking around one state agency or another. The embarrassed Dewey belatedly ordered a series of investigations. He seemingly intended to show his determination to spare no one, by going after the man who was next in line of succession to the Governorship. But instead of yielding, as he often had during legislative conferences, Wicks fought back furiously. If it was improper for him to visit Fay, a point he never conceded, Wicks wanted to know if Dewey had not acted far more improperly in releasing from the state prison Charles "Lucky" Luciano, the alleged world narcotics king, who served only nine years of a 30-to-50 year term.

He asked this question in public. In private there were even more recriminations between the Governor and Lieutenant-Governor. At one point the bitterness reached such heights that Dewey's aides are reported to have threatened to knock off the public payroll everyone whom Wicks had ever recommended for a job.

But the Wicks case was only one phase of the mess in Albany. J. Russell Sprague, the Republican National Committeeman from New York, resigned under fire because of vast holdings in one of the racket-ridden racetracks. And Dewey's Republican State Chairman quit a few months ago, apparently unable to stomach what he knew was going on around him.


FAY

All this would seem to mean the Dewey machine is falling apart and conversely that the outlook for New York Democrats is better than it has been in a decade.

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Paris Dispatch: THE SURVIVAL OF FRANCE

The damage done to Western Europeans' respect and admiration for General Eisenhower by his role in the White case is hard to exaggerate. It may be equally hard to repair. The aspect of the case which has caused "consternation" is the conduct neither of Harry White nor of Harry Truman, but of Eisenhower himself. In the US form of government, Congress may be outside the control of the President; but a member of the Cabinet—the Attorney General who brought the case to the attention of the Congressional committee at this time—is responsible only to the White House. In one way or another many Western European newspapers echo the view of the staunchly anti-Communist *Franc-Tireur* of Paris that:

> What is grave in this affair, hurled as if by chance, against Truman and his party 48 hours after a resounding Republican defeat isn't so much that a "McCarthy committee" grabbed hold of it, as that the Attorney General, protected by the President's authority, took the initiative. Thus McCarthyism has come into the government by the front door, and the President dares less than ever to condemn it openly. The President could have been more vigorous in defending the honor of his predecessor who gave his name to the doctrine of containment of Soviet expansion, created the Marshall Plan and the Atlantic Pact, ordered the Berlin air lift and stopped aggression in Korea. Only the Kremlin and its allies will be amused by calling Truman before a Congressional investigation committee.
>
> Free men are clearly struck with consternation by the unprecedented spectacle offered by Eisenhower's America. The lack of intellectual courage of the former Commander in Chief of the allied forces is the greatest disappointment of his first year in the White House. What authority can he have in the world, at Bermuda and elsewhere, if he shows such weakness against the most delirious manifestations of intolerance and hysteria?

The reference to a lack of intellectual courage is specifically relevant in the context of the Bermuda conference. Whether or not it be true that Sir Winston Churchill suggested the meeting at this time—the worst possible time for the French because of the campaign for the Presidential election on December 17—the explanation of its purpose, as given in Washington, is that the German situation has urgently to be "discussed" frankly and freely by the three heads of government. But arrangements appear to have already been made at the Pentagon, obviously sanctioned by the White House, to move fairly large numbers of US soldiers from West Germany to France early in 1954. The decision to bypass both French refusal to ratify the EDC and French vetoing of West Germany's entry into the NATO has *already* been taken. Either openly or secretly the Bermuda conference will grant Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's wish—"separate" ratification of the Bonn treaties, end of the occupation (at least the Anglo-American), and the practical start toward creating a German army to replace the departing occupation (though not *all* the Anglo-American armed) forces.

This fact may be denied in Washington or London, or it may be parried as Eisenhower has parried requests for clarification of his real stand and real responsibility in the conduct of the White case.

In the versions of the White case which Western Europeans have been getting from the US, they have learned that one of the proofs of his espionage for the Soviets was his role, in 1945, in helping draw up the Morgenthau Plan for limiting German industrial power. That may have been a bad, an absurd, an impossible plan. But it is not, even now in 1953, a crime in the opinion of large sections of Western European opinion to be concerned about the growth of German power, either industrial or military.



The British are particularly worried about the fact that, as the *Manchester Guardian* puts it, "The great industrial combine of Friedrich Krupp is emerging as Britain's most dangerous competitor as an exporter of construction machinery to the under-developed areas of the world. Krupp will become part-owner of key industries in the British Empire, as well as elsewhere."

West Germany's exports to China, including steel products, have increased twenty-fold in the last 12 months. To meet this strong competition, the British Board of Trade has just lifted the two-and-one-half year old ban on the export of small automobiles to China; and soon machine tools, electrical and chemical products, as well as rubber from Malay, are expected to be "freed." Such a change in official attitude could hardly have been possible without the consent of the White House and State Department. Nor would Secretary Dulles have hinted recently that the US refusal to recognize Red China was not necessarily "permanent" if there were not—in the Bermuda conference—the makings of an Anglo-American deal. The British will get some of what they want in Asia, and the Americans will get what they want in Europe—the green light for Adenauer's Germany.

But what will the French get? And does it matter whether they get anything at all? After all, French Premier Laniel and Foreign Minister Bidault must have some idea of what is in store for France at Bermuda. Both happen to be among the pro-US candidates for the office of French President; that is, both agree with Anthony Eden's equally pro-US position that Germany would be "less dangerous if drawn into the EDC, under which her armament would be controlled by agreement, than if entirely free, having an independent national army to use as she wished to fulfill whatever aims she liked." Other candidates for the post in the Elysee Palace, however, disagree: they are not reassured by present evidence of how the control is to be exercised; they are afraid moreover that West Germany might eagerly fulfill whatever aim that may be liked in the US by those who consider it a crime to limit German power.

The Bermuda conference cannot help but play politics in France. It may give a pro-US, pro-EDC Frenchman the job of President. It certainly won't help common, joint democratic Western policy with very broad sections of public opinion in France, Britain and elsewhere in Western Europe.

Paris FRANK CORRELL

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TRUMAN ON TRIAL

Behind the charges and countercharges—an effort to reach the truth

SINCE NOVEMBER 6 when Attorney General Herbert Brownell spoke in Chicago, a former President of the United States has been on trial. The charge, as Mr. Truman argued, was one of "knowingly betraying the security of the United States." The procedure, in its reliance on hidden documents, its incitement of the mob spirit, its elevation of police power resembles less an American courtroom than the spectacle of which the center is Mohammed Mossadegh.

As always, in such trials, the nation that looks on is pulled apart. Those who condemn Mr. Brownell hold that he is playing cheap politics with a grave issue at a time of peril. Those who defend Mr. Brownell agree that his action was political. To them, that in itself constitutes a defense. This amounts to arguing that in American politics no holds are barred. If this were true—that in politics alone of the professions, we set no standards of good conduct—it would be a harsh indictment of our democratic society. But even then, the claim would still be inadequate to rationalize the action taken by Mr. Brownell. There is no precedent in American history for his attack on the loyalty of a former President. *The violence of his charge and the manner of its presentation make Mr. Brownell's action less an expression of traditional politics than a declaration of political war.*

This, and not the quibble over dates and places, is the significance of the events that Mr. Brownell has set in motion, for it sets the spirit in which the party in power intends to govern and the temper it must maintain in the people if it is to continue in office. And yet the details of the revelations rather than the direction of the government now command the country's attention. For this reason they must be closely reviewed and well remembered through all that is to come. Mr. Brownell is rounding up a posse of half the nation, and in any posse rumors become facts, suspicions become charges and charges mount and multiply until the man who first voiced the charges is trampled in a headlong rush.

The truth is obscure and may never be found. But because it may grow more obscure *and less important* as tempers rise, it is useful now to turn behind the charges and countercharges to search, without rancor, for the truth.

How Broad Was Soviet Espionage?

Without any doubt there was extensive Soviet espionage in America during and just after World War II. It was the method chosen by the Soviet Government for obtaining information, much of which was given officially to other wartime allies. Had the Soviet Government chosen to join the combined administrative machinery by which the allied war effort was managed, it would have participated in the decisions it learned of through espionage and shared the information on which those decisions were based. Instead, ridden with suspicion, and dreaming of world revolution, the Kremlin chose to fight its own separate war, keeping the allied governments at arm's length, and using its agents to steal what might have been given.

There were many espionage groups in Washington, as in every allied government. As the facts are brought out, new groups and new ties will undoubtedly appear. The present charge concerns one circle known as the Silvermaster Group.

This group was not representative of the New Deal or the Fair Deal. Its members were not advanced through the conscious sponsorship of non-Communist officials. They worked their way up through great individual ability and cunning collective effort. The Senate Committee on Internal Security reports soberly, and we think accurately, of the members:

> They used each other's names for reference on applications for federal employment. They hired each

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other. They promoted each other. They raised each other's salaries.

They transferred each other from bureau to bureau, from department to department, from Congressional committee to Congressional committee. They assigned each other to international missions. They vouched for each other's loyalty and protected each other when exposure threatened.

At the center of this group, according to the Senate Committee, was Harry Dexter White. This, of course, is conjecture strenuously denied by White before his death but documented by handwritten memoranda, prepared for transmission to Russia. When added to all the other evidence, it seems to us to be convincing.

Yet we must realize that it is convincing only in the light of seven years of the Cold War. In August, 1945, when Miss Bentley informed the FBI that men long suspected of being Communists were in fact acting as Soviet agents, the FBI was slow to believe her story. It questioned her first on an essentially irrelevant issue. It showed deep concern only in November. It set out then to check her allegations. Miss Bentley recalls in her book the moment at which she could record: "By now I knew the FBI believed my story!" The date was January 20, 1946.

Was the Espionage "Known" in 1946?

Rehearsing the story seven years later, with all the wisdom that hindsight provides, Attorney General Brownell states flatly that in January, 1946, Harry White, like his associates, was known by those who promoted him to be "a Soviet spy."

This is the heart of Brownell's charge. Quite apart from its grave implications, does the statement itself, and above all the key word *"known"* bear examination?

How Dangerous Was Communism?

The first inkling gained by the federal government of what is called the "Silvermaster Group" was gained in August, 1945, when Elizabeth Bentley, the courier of the group which formed in 1941, told her story to the FBI. The names, cited by Miss Bentley, were familiar to the FBI. It had infiltrated the Communist Party on the direction of President Roosevelt after 1939. The Senate Subcommittee notes that four members of the group, Harry White, Harry Magdoff, Maurice Halperin and Harold Glasser, were the subjects of derogatory information received by the FBI in 1941 and 1942. Miss Bentley further records in her book, *Out of Bondage,* that Harry White "had been tied up with the revolutionary movement for many years." Gregory Silvermaster had "a long background in the revolutionary movement" and had been "a very active member of the party." Mary Price "was a Communist of many years standing." Julius Joseph was "an open Communist" of "long standing." George Silverman was "a Communist of long standing." Ludwig Ullmann had been persuaded by the Silvermasters "to join a Communist Party unit in Washington." Elizabeth Bentley herself joined the Communist Party in 1935, was well known in party circles and for some weeks in 1941 was trailed by two FBI agents. Yet Mr. Hoover makes no claim that he was even aware of the group's existence or activities before November, 1945. Nor is that matter for criticism now. His understanding of Communism was gained over years. His views, like those of his superiors, were swiftly developing in the winter of 1945. Today, with the benefit of hindsight, Mr. Brownell charges blindness. How far back is he prepared to look?

Did the FBI Submit "Proof"?

Mr. Brownell claims that the FBI submitted proof to the White House that White and his associates were Soviet spies. The first report he cites is the top-secret letter sent by special messenger on November 8, 1945, from J. Edgar Hoover to President Truman's Military Aide, General Harry Vaughan.

This is the letter which Mr. Hoover characterizes simply as a "preliminary flash." With a restraint now wholly lacking in Mr. Brownell, Hoover is careful in this "flash" to indicate how tentative is his information. He begins by stating that the FBI has gained recent information not *proving* but *"indicating"* that "a number of persons employed by the government" have been turning over information for transmission to Soviet Russia. He states plainly: *"It is impossible to determine exactly how many of these people had actual knowledge of the information they were transmitting."* He adds, "The Bureau's information at this time *indicates* that the following persons were participants in this operation *or were utilized* by principals in this ring for the purpose of obtaining data in which the Soviet Government is interested." (Italics ours.) The transcript as published in the *New York Times* further indicates that the name of one suspect, Victor Perlo, was even misspelled as "Perlow," so great was Mr. Hoover's anxiety to make his "preliminary" report known without loss of time.

From this time in early November on, the FBI was engaged in following up every assertion and clue presented by Miss Bentley. Presumably it opened the mail, tapped the telephones and monitored the conferences of the suspects Miss Bentley named. Then after three months, Mr. Hoover was satisfied that Miss Bentley's story was accurate. Noting that White was due for a new appointment, he sent a report on White to General Vaughan.

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

In this letter Mr. Hoover carefully refrained from asserting that White was a spy. He noted that the "charge" had been made, that White had "allegedly" passed on material and that he was "reportedly" a part of a spy ring. In the introduction to the report which was attached, Mr. Hoover added that the reliability of the information was accepted by the FBI.

Seven years later, Mr. Brownell cited excerpts from this secret report before a legislative committee and declared that in fact they constituted evidence beyond doubt.

Is this conclusion justified by the excerpts quoted indirectly by Brownell? Most of the report as he paraphrases it sets forth the story by Elizabeth Bentley. The changes since November are the detail of her story and the FBI evaluation that she is a reliable informant.

Beyond Miss Bentley's own story, the February 6 report as Mr. Brownell interprets it, adds details gathered by the FBI. It notes that in the three months from November to February, White was associated with the people named by Miss Bentley; that he was invited to the house of Alger Hiss; that he was friendly with other suspects such as Frank Coe and Lee Pressman; and that other suspects named by Miss Bentley had been previously accused of membership in the Communist Party.

Seven years later, this would prove sufficient to fire White from government, if not to indict him for espionage. Was it sufficient at the time?

Here it must be noted that Brownell is less than honest.

He offers as evidence the fact that White visited in New York a certain Doctor Abraham Wolfson, suspected of being a Communist. He does not add what the report presumably added, that Dr. Wolfson was in fact a dentist and that White may have gone to him to have his teeth fixed.

He offers as further evidence the fact that White associated with Glasser and Mrs. Sonia Gold. He does not add, as the report presumably added, that this was hardly surprising since Glasser was in White's own office, while Mrs. Gold was White's personal secretary.

But these are the least damaging questions that must be asked of Attorney General Brownell.

Brownell told the Senate Committee, under oath, that the summary he gave of the February 6 report was an accurate summary. He claimed that no person with legal training "could reach a different result." He stated that what he told the Senate were the "essential facts," clearly implying that they were all the facts that could be disclosed without "jeopardizing confidential sources of information and techniques of intelligence operations."

Is this all the truth? No citizen can answer that key question, which is one reason why Brownell's action in releasing selected excerpts of the report was such a travesty. Yet the citizen is still free to surmise that it contained more *"essential facts"* than he chose to reveal.

The FBI report of February 6, in documenting the case against White, presumably dealt in detail with all available evidence concerning every suspect named as a member of the Silvermaster Group. Of these 10 suspects, three worked in the Office of Strategic Services. A fourth, Abraham Silverman, was employed by the US Air Force then under the Army. A fifth member, Ludwig Ullmann, was a Major assigned to the Pentagon. A sixth member, Gregory Silvermaster, worked for the Board of Economic Warfare, under military direction.

The heads of these Departments included Gen. William Donovan, now President Eisenhower's chief representative in Southeast Asia, and General Eisenhower.

A further clue to the February report can be found in Mr. Truman's speech. While the speech was made on the previous day, and did not anticipate Mr. Brownell's supposed summary, Mr. Truman did state:

> The February report showed that serious accusations had been made against White but it pointed out that it would be practically impossible to prove those charges with the evidence then at hand.

It may be further significant that Mr. Brownell did not state to whom, besides General Vaughan, the February 6 report was sent.

Given these inferences some pointed questions must be directed to Mr. Brownell concerning the February 6 report he summarized in sworn testimony.

Did the report contain more "essential facts" that can be released without endangering security?

Were these facts withheld by Mr. Brownell because they involved leading Republicans or allies of the Eisenhower Administration?

Did the report state that the evidence presented could not be accepted as proof?

These are questions that no Senator on the Subcommittee chose to direct to Mr. Brownell. Until he is called back and questioned further, an unjust burden will rest on Harry Truman, who doubtless has the report, who without doubt knows that its release in full would aid materially in his defense, and who is compelled to forego his own self defense because he possesses the respect for the sanctity of FBI files that in Mr. Brownell is wholly lacking.

There is a final question to be asked of Brownell concerning the secret report he saw fit to release in part as proof that the Truman Administration was "blind." Did the FBI enter any reservations about the information contained in the February 6 report? Did it indicate whether or not this information could be taken as final and acted upon? Or did it state in line with Mr. Hoover's published letters that further investigation was

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proceeding which might produce some definite proof?

Brownell, we assume, will never volunteer answers to these questions. And any man who seeks to clear the good name of President Truman will find that no one can keep up with an Attorney General with the FBI files at his disposal—if the Attorney General is able to release the excerpts that support his case, from the files that suit him, at the times of his choosing.

Meanwhile no man of conscience can accept Brownell's assertion that on the evidence he has presented, and the possible reservations he may have withheld, it was "known" to President Truman that Harry White was without question "a Soviet spy." Brownell himself exposes this fatal flaw in his brief when he attempts to bolster his argument by asserting that eight of the suspects in the Silvermaster Group subsequently claimed their constitutional privilege in declining to answer questions that might incriminate them. Here Brownell is not only offering as evidence of Truman's "blindness" in 1946 events that took place as late as 1952. In this, Brownell, the nation's chief legal officer, is further violating the well-established legal principle that citation of the Fifth Amendment cannot and must not be construed as evidence of guilt.

What Did the Truman Administration Do?

The temper and tension released by Mr. Brownell's charges derive from his charge that Harry Dexter White "was known" by President Truman "to be a Communist spy" when he appointed him to the International Monetary Fund. It has been demonstrated here that if President Truman had seen Mr. Hoover's letter of November 8 and his memorandum of December 6 before he sent White's name to the Senate on January 23, Brownell's charge would still be overdrawn. And Mr. Truman states flatly that he did not see these documents. Mr. Brownell has expressed his amazement at this reply but submitted no further proof. Yet he, the nation's chief legal officer, has failed to withdraw the gravest charge ever levelled at a President of the United States.

Was There an Agreement?

On February 6, 1946, hours after the Senate had confirmed White's appointment, Mr. Truman learned of the charges against him from Secretary Byrnes. He sent for the report and read it at once. He then called Secretary of the Treasury Fred Vinson and instructed him to meet with Attorney General Tom Clark and Mr. Hoover and to bring back a recommendation.

Mr. Hoover, in sworn testimony, has stated that both he and Mr. Clark at first expressed the view that it would be unwise to permit White to go to the Fund. Mr. Hoover has further described what then took place.

> I was told that the problem was what could be done to prevent White from taking the oath of office. Judge Vinson did not want Mr. White to serve as a United States delegate on the International Monetary Fund and in fact did not want him to continue as our Assistant Secretary of the Treasury.
>
> On the other hand, Judge Vinson stated that the President could be forced to sign the commission since the Senate had already confirmed White's appointment. I advised Judge Vinson and the Attorney General that the character of the evidence was such that it should not be publicly disclosed at that time. . . .

Judge Vinson and Mr. Clark, according to Mr. Hoover, decided to present three possible courses of action to the President.

> One, the President could dismiss White and make no statement.
>
> Two, the President could send for White and tell him he had changed his mind and that he desired White to resign and not serve.
>
> Three, the President could sign the commission, instruct the Attorney General to continue the investigation vigorously and instruct the Secretary of the Treasury that he . . . should take steps to see that all persons selected for appointment [to the International Monetary Fund] should not be appointed except with [his] approval.

None of these courses, it is worth noting, could conceivably sustain Mr. Brownell's charge of near treason although these facts were certainly known to Mr. Brownell when he spoke. Nor is it clear that the Administration did not take the course which Mr. Brownell himself would have followed at that time.

Mr. Hoover does not state that one of these three courses was recommended by the group, although such a step would have been logical. His memorandum on the conference would no doubt enlighten the nation on this interesting point. It seems probable that Mr. Clark, acting for the Department of Justice, recommended the action which was accepted by the President, that Judge Vinson concurred, and that Mr. Hoover at least acquiesced. But Judge Vinson is dead, Mr. Clark has so far chosen to act as if he were dead, and Mr. Hoover's office memoranda are not among the documents disinterred. Mr. Truman has accepted these handicaps. His speech contains this sober but revealing assertion:

> The conclusion was reached that the appointment should be allowed to take its normal course. The final responsibility for this decision of course was mine.

Here the word "final" itself all-but makes clear that the President acted on the advice of those whose positive recommendations he had called for.

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Mr. Hoover declares:

> I did not enter into any agreement to shift White. . . . At no time was the FBI a party to an agreement to promote . . . Harry Dexter White and at no time did the FBI give its approval to such an agreement.

From these assertions banner headlines were drawn by newspapers as fair-minded as the *Washington Post*. The inference was obvious—and unjustified. More conscientious than the headline writers, Mr. Hoover was careful to add:

> Such an agreement on the part of the FBI would be inconceivable.

In repeated arguments Mr. Hoover makes it plain that he refers here not to the FBI evaluation of the evidence on White but to the steadfast determination of the FBI not to make evaluations or to participate in decisions on matter of policy. (Mr. Hoover's first comment on White's employment, presumably being an exception) *Was White promoted?*

Mr. Brownell in his original and central charge declared:

> Harry Dexter White was known to be a Communist spy by the very people who appointed him to the most secretive and important position he ever held in Government service.

The word "known" has been shown to be false on two counts: the term "Communist spy" is a finding which a court of law alone can make. Does the remaining reference to "the most secretive and important position" bear examination?

From 1941 until 1946, Harry White was a key man in an important department of the government. He had full access to Treasury files. In addition, in December 1941 he had been ordered by Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau to "assume full responsibility for all matters with which the Treasury Department has to deal having a bearing on foreign relations." He was further ordered on February 25, 1943, to "take supervision over and assume full responsibility for Treasury's participation in all economic and financial matters . . . in connection with the operations of the Army and Navy . . . in the foreign areas in which our armed forces are operating or are likely to operate." Under this broad directive, White represented the Treasury on the Interdepartmental Lend Lease Committee, the Canadian American Joint Economic Committee, the Natural Resources Committee, the Committee on Post War Economic Problems, the National Munitions Control Board, the Board of Economic Warfare, the Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy, the Liberation Areas Committee, the Office of Strategic Services Advisory Committee and eight other important and sensitive agencies of government. As Treasury Administrator, he travelled through the world and led United States delegations to important conferences. He drafted memoranda on matters from Germany to Japan which, (while they frequently differed from known Communist policy,) were highly influential in determining the position of the United States.

In contrast, in this new appointment to which President Truman assigned him, White was no more than one of 15 Executive Directors of a limited, non-sensitive international agency without access to secret files or power over high decisions taken by the US. Mr. Hoover reported to General Vaughan the concern of an unnamed Canadian source that White might be made President of the Fund and in this position might "influence to a great degree deliberations on all international financial arrangements." This warning of Mr. Hoover's was heeded. *Time* of April 1, 1946 reports under the head *Bad Start* that at the Savannah Conference of the Fund

> the British did not like the way Fred Vinson sidetracked Assistant Treasury Secretary Harry White, one of the foster fathers of Bretton Woods and top US expert. They got on well with him, thought he was the best man to head the fund.

Clearly, Brownell's assertion that a directorship of the Fund was a more sensitive and important job than the Assistant Secretaryship of the Treasury is wholly without foundation. Any reasonably informed reader of the press would have known this to be true. So presumably did the Attorney General when he made the assertion. He was questioned on this score in Senate testimony:

> SENATOR BUTLER: Mr. Attorney General, are you in a position to evaluate the relative sensitivity of the position of the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury and a director of the International Monetary Fund?
>
> MR. BROWNELL: The salary of Assistant Secretary of the Treasury was ninety-six or ninety-eight hundred dollars.
>
> SENATOR BUTLER: I am directing my question more to the question of sensitivity.
>
> MR. BROWNELL: The salary of the other was about $17,000.

Mr. Brownell added that the powers of a director of the Fund were substantial and that Russia would have been glad to know the information contained in a Director's files. This, if not the gravest or most dangerous, is certainly the shabbiest of the positions taken by Mr. Brownell.

What Happened to Other Suspects?

Mr. Truman has stated that he chose to allow White's appointment to stand because:

> The charges which had been made against Mr. White also involved many other persons. Hundreds of FBI agents were engaged in investigating the charges against all those who had been accused.
>
> It was of great importance to the nation that this investigation be continued in order to prove or disprove these charges and to determine if still other persons were implicated.
>
> Any unusual action with respect to Mr. White's appointment might well have alerted all the persons

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involved . . . and thus . . . endangered the success of the investigation.

This assertion, as far as it goes, is certainly true. The FBI continued its surveillance of all the suspects named by Miss Bentley throughout 1946. Meanwhile Miss Bentley, at the insistence of the FBI, tried to work her way back into the group. Information was obtained in 1946 that convinced the FBI of the accuracy of Miss Bentley's charges. But apparently little new evidence was gained. Early in 1947 direct interrogation of the suspects began. In June they were brought before a Grand Jury called to consider indictment of the "Silvermaster Group." The Grand Jury heard the evidence for eighteen months, and decided that no case had been presented against any member of the group that called for court action. Its conclusion was based largely on the inadmissible nature of evidence gained by wire-tapping. But to assert that this alone frustrated action is to argue that the group carried on all its business over the telephone. It is more probable that following Miss Bentley's detection, and at the first indication of surveillance, the group became dormant and committed few if any further acts of espionage.

In place of his original charge Mr. Brownell, fully prepared and under oath, submits the second, equally serious, assertion that

> The records available to me fail to show that anything was done which interfered with the continuing functioning of the espionage ring of which White was a part.

Here even after the protests of the press and the partial repudiation by his President, Mr. Brownell indulges in reckless and uncalled for exaggeration. He ignores altogether the matter of FBI surveillance and its subsequent deterrent effect. He speaks simply of three steps which he claims were not taken: to forewarn a wide group of officials and to circumscribe the status of the suspects—steps which if taken would have destroyed the purpose of surveillance for which the suspects were kept on.

The fact remains, to support Brownell's case, that the suspects were continued for periods of twelve to eighteen months in important and sensitive jobs. Harold Glasser went to the Moscow meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers as an adviser to Secretary of State George Marshall.

Nathan Silvermaster was promoted in March, 1946, to become the Chief Economist of the War Assets Administration's Division of Economic and Monetary Research. Irving Kaplan, William Ullman and Victor Perlo stayed on in the Treasury for as long as a year.

Only one suspect, Frank Coe, was continued in employment beyond 1947. He continued as Secretary of the International Monetary Fund until December 3, 1952. Coe's case, of course, was special. As secretary of the International Monetary Fund Coe was responsible not to the US Government but to the Fund's Board of 16 Directors and through them its Board of 55 Governors. He was further subject to the Fund's own security system. Only in 1953 was a loyalty Board in the US Civil Service Administration assigned to the review of Americans employed in international agencies.

Mr. Hoover has stated that in espionage cases he regards arrest and publicity as a "last resort." Neither he nor Mr. Brownell have produced documents beyond February, 1946, to show that the FBI was alarmed by the continued employment of the suspects he had named.

Yet it is true, as Brownell charges, that the men named, and no doubt others, were permitted to continue in government despite strong and developing evidence of disloyalty. And while Brownell chooses to ignore one reason for this action, it seems doubtful that it was the only reason.

Mr. Truman does not in fact state that the sole reason for the continued employment of the men named was to trap them. But he cited no other reason in his November 17 speech.

Here, Mr. Hoover's testimony, the known facts, and what is generally remembered of the spirit and temper of 1946, strongly suggest that there was more to the willingness to leave suspected men in government than the desire to trap them in continuing espionage.

Ignoring, perhaps with reason, the matter of FBI surveillance, Mr. Brownell charges that in keeping on the suspected officials of the government, the Truman Administration was blind. Blindness is not yet an indictable offense, but it is a grave charge when coupled with Communist espionage.

Was the Truman Administration Blind?

How far can this charge be sustained? The charge, it should be noted, is directed against many men. They certainly are directed against the government officials who were sent copies of the December 6 report. These men were Adm. William Leahy, Gen. Hoyt Vandenberg, Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, and Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal. Were these men blind?

We do not, we repeat, believe that the Administration refrained from firing the suspected officials in early 1946 solely in order to trap them. That was one reason. We suggest that there were these further reasons involved:

First, the Truman Administration was an untried Administration, preoccupied with immense policy decisions that were made in 1945 and 1946 when the US under

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Truman took up its world-wide stand against Soviet expansion.

Second, the United States was wholly unaccustomed to dealing with the problem of security. The problem of espionage, so familiar to Europe, was for us largely new.

Third, the reluctance of the political officials of the Administration to precipitate a political scandal, and the further concern of diplomatic officials while critical negotiations were going on, led both groups to grasp at Mr. Hoover's term, that publicity in an espionage case should be the "last resort."

Fourth, the men around Truman were reluctant to take the word of a confessed traitor against that of known and trusted civil servants. They shared the resistance that is deep in every one of us to admitting that we have been tricked and fooled. Far more important, they had been taught to believe since childhood that a man was innocent until proven guilty in a court of law.

THIS POINT at least is recognized by Mr. Brownell. He replies simply:

"Government employment is a privilege not a right, and we don't have to wait until a man is convicted of treason before we can remove him from a position of trust and confidence."

It is true that government employment like all employment is a privilege. But it is also true that being fired from government on grounds of treason amounts to punishment, and that punishment is illegal if it is not preceded by due process of law.

Mr. Brownell makes a broad distinction between the way civil servants can be punished, by firings, and the way in which citizens must be treated in a court of law. This is sound administrative doctrine today—is it really so praiseworthy? The government is not a court. But Mr. Truman was a judge. He, and each man around him like every good American, was trained from the time he learned to read, in the meaning and supreme importance of due process. He did not have to apply the letter of due process in asking White to resign. Eight years later Mr. Brownell finds it easy to say that he should have rushed in, without proof, and dismissed men accused of the gravest of charges by unknown informants. Instead Mr. Truman moved slowly under the human restraints set by respect for due process.

Partisans of Mr. Truman cite the climate of 1945 in defense of his caution in moving against subversion. Partisans of Mr. Brownell have their answer prepared. Rewriting history in the week after the event took place, *Time* declared:

"Nobody would accuse Roosevelt or Truman of disloyalty. What they were accused of was creating and maintaining a political climate in which treason flourished."

That deserves study, and the study begins three pages further on in *Time,* where six men are identified as the "cast of characters" to substantiate its case.

What led these six men to transfer their allegiance to Communism? Was it the New Deal, or the Fair Deal? The ages of the six men are listed by *Time;* they are 48, 49, 54, 45, 46, 41, 47 and 50. The concentration is fascinating. All six are within 13 years of each other. All six grew up under Republican rule. They were infants when President Harding took office. The youngest was 21, the oldest 34, when the Republican era came to its end. *The great formative experience that shaped the minds of these men* was not the New Deal or the Fair Deal, but the misery of mass unemployment of the depression. It was the incapacity of the American Government, under a Republican President, that drove young men like these to the extreme of Communism. It was the successful reform movement of Roosevelt and Truman that we can thank because the number is six (or 60,000) and not six million today.

Certainly the climate of 1946 was utterly different from the climate of 1952. The basic difference was not a softness towards Communism but a totally dissimilar evaluation of the relative importance of security and civil liberty in the life of the United States. It was widely believed in 1946 that all Americans were equally and fully entitled to participate in government and share the fruits of democracy. No leading member of the Roosevelt or Truman Administrations that we can recall knowingly employed a member of the Communist Party in a policy-making job. Nor was any government official clear as to how to deprive an established civil servant, who proved to be a Communist, of his rights.

Certainly there was a desire that overseas, and in the United Nations, Communists and non-Communists should work together. That view, so logical then, so barren now, was expressed week after week in the pages of this magazine.

On February 4, 1946, we published an article by a non-Communist urging a "genuine coalition in China."

On February 11, we were confronted by the fact that "in the selection of the Secretary-General, Russia's candidate Trygve Lie was taken."

On March 4 we commented, quite wrongly, on the Canadian spy trial: "There is grave danger that by the immense inertia of fear and competitive rearmament peace will lose its hold upon life. This is the meaning of the present spy scare in Canada."

No doubt we were wrong here—and many Republicans were right. Were they always right? Were they right on the greatest of all decisions—the decision to use America's resources to halt the spreading hunger, disease and misery of the postwar world, from which Communist revolution was then preparing to emerge? Were the great body of Republicans on Capitol Hill right, when they moved to delay and frustrate this program on the grounds that it was a waste of dollars? It is perfectly true that the efforts of liberals and many Democrats were turned against the hearings held by the House Un-American Activities Committee. The

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reason was not supporting Communism but scorn of the manner in which it was investigated. Robert K. Carr, in his objective and exhaustive study of the Committee from 1945 to 1950, notes that:

> As one rereads today the record of the hearings . . . it must be acknowledged that the Committee was shedding light upon the revolutionary aims of international Communism at a time when many Americans were inclined to believe that . . . Communism and democracy could live together peacefully. At the same time the Committee made this information available to the American people in such a disorderly and at times irresponsible way that the impact of its findings upon public opinion was much less strong than it might have been.

Of course, there were Communists in America after the legacy of the depression. Certainly they were a threat in government at the end of the war. Tolerance then was not the sole province of the Democrats. It was one of the most respected leaders of the Republican Party, Under-Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson, who intervened to keep G. N. Silvermaster employed in a sensitive job on the Board of Economic Warfare after the Chief of Army Intelligence had submitted evidence of his Communist affiliations and branded him disloyal. It was Wendell Willkie who in November, 1942, and again on March 12, 1943, served without pay as counsel for the Communist Party leader William Schneiderman in his case heard before the Supreme Court. Acting as co-counsel with a Communist Party lawyer, Willkie was instrumental in persuading the majority of the US Supreme Court to rule for Schneiderman on the ground that there was no "clear unequivocal and convincing" proof that the Communist Party as a whole was committed to the use of force or violence. That we should remember, and not without pride, was when Willkie was the titular head of the Republican Party.

Who then will cast the first stone? *Time* magazine? In rejecting the defense of the political climate of 1945, *Time* records that "Political climate is man made." It adds, "The moral confusion that marked the Roosevelt Administration made it possible for White and Company to attain great power." But the editors of *Time,* before advancing further, should reread the biography of their alumnus and favorite author. Some of the most eloquent and deeply felt passages in *Witness* are those in which Whittaker Chambers describes his struggles against the moral confusion that reigned in the offices of *Time* magazine in precisely the years now under review.

Men have known for 2,000 years that it is a dangerous pastime for one time to place another on trial. It was in a similar time of great change, when the ancient virtues were being replaced by the raw violence that Cato the Elder was called before an inquisitorial committee in Rome. Cato was in his eighties—at the end of a lifetime of distinguished service to the Empire. But the brash Senators who confronted him demanded an accounting of his early mistakes. *"Gentlemen,"* Cato replied, *"it is not easy to render an accounting of one's life to an age other than the age in which one has lived."*

Has Brownell Undermined Our Liberties?

Mr. Brownell's charges culminate in a single conclusion—thanks to the Truman legacy of indifference to Communist espionage the nation stands in present danger—a danger which compels the Eisenhower Administration, in defense of the nation's security, to engage in further exposures and to press for new laws.

This issue, which the Republican National Chairman states will dominate the elections of 1954 and 1956, is a blind. The problem of infiltration was tackled in 1947 by President Truman and resolved before Eisenhower moved into the White House.

To offset this damaging fact Mr. Brownell points to the 1,456 government officials severed from the government since January, 1953, on security grounds. Pressed by a Southern Senator he concedes that the 1,456 is made up of drunkards and perverts as well as suspected Communist sympathizers and in unknown proportions.

A more relevant question is: on what evidence, and by what due process were these 1,456 punished.

Within months of the time he learned of the charges on Harry White, President Truman sent out the directives that led to the prosecutions of Communist Party leaders and to creation of the federal loyalty program.

One reason why many officials were reluctant to move against hidden Communists in government was their unwillingness to pry into the private lives and attitudes of 999 in every 1,000 non-Communist civil servants in order to uncover the attitudes of the remaining one. Their reluctance was overriden. In the years between 1947 and 1953, 6,644,496 civil servants were checked for loyalty and security by the Truman Administration and 25,748 on whom some derogatory information was turned up were subjected to full field investigations by the FBI. Loyalty Boards made up of more Republicans than Democrats took up the cases where something less than total innocence was indicated. Numberless thousands of loyal civil servants were compelled at their own expense to clear themselves or suffer the consequences.

Basic violations of American concepts were involved in this procedure. Men were, in effect, presumed to be guilty until they proved themselves innocent. They were not permitted to know the identity of their accusers, or even the nature of the accusations levelled against them. They were not tried by trained judges under

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court procedures. They were confronted with no clear charges. If they were found guilty of the charges, they were punished. Yet, unlike drivers arrested of drunken driving, they had no ready means of appeal to a court.

This is the system condemned by Brownell for its inadequacies; its abuses are more to the point. Under the Eisenhower program, the safeguards have been minimized, the standards lowered, the charges made more vague; the abuses multiplied. Not without reason did the White House reporters, in response to Mr. Eisenhower's query, inform the President that the label of McCarthyism hangs on his Administration if not on him.

As the contagion of suspicion spreads teachers, entertainers, employees of state and local government, all citizens are brought under the sway of arbitrary power. Now Mr. Brownell in one stroke has done more to weaken the democratic safeguards than was accomplished in all the years in which this nation was engaged in turning back the domestic Communist threat. Explaining that he could not make public the full FBI report of February 6 "without jeopardizing confidential sources of information and techniques of operation," Mr. Brownell saw fit to release his chosen excerpts.

In immediate contradiction of his own actions Mr. Brownell added: "We will never impair the work of the FBI by making public FBI reports." This statement alone is deadly in its implications, for the FBI has built up dossiers on the private lives and views of hundreds of thousands and perhaps millions of American citizens. These individuals are not limited to public servants. The dossiers are not limited to crimes that have been committed. They contain every significant allegation received by the FBI, as Mr. Hoover has warned, however incorrect and malicious it may be.

To argue then, as Mr. Brownell does, that these files cannot be released because the release would impair the sources and techniques of the FBI is tantamount to saying "I will never deliberately run over a child with my car because I might dent a fender."

The precedent is established and accepted with extraordinary equanimity by the nation's press. From now on, until Brownell's action is repudiated, the citizens without number who are the subject of FBI dossiers, if they oppose the party in power, do so in the knowledge that the Attorney General of the United States may see fit to excerpt any charge from any file at any time—even though the same file contains additional information of a contrary nature. The Attorney General may, if he chooses, accuse any man of a crime, substantiating his charge from such paragraphs of a secret document as it pleases him to present to the press.

Mr. Hoover has fought hard to prevent this abuse, even to the point of considering his resignation when Judge Reeves ordered the FBI files cited in the Coplon case to be shown or the case dismissed. Now even Mr. Hoover, while he rejects the responsibility for evaluating his findings, is party to the publication of a secret report



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in which charges are presented together with the statement that in the view of the FBI the information is reliable.

Once the hole in this dyke is opened it must grow as the information pours out. For six years the Executive and Congress have been locked in a bitter struggle concerning the sanctity of the FBI files. Always until now the government has held the line. Now, two days after the testimony of Mr. Hoover and Attorney General Brownell, the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee has released "a summary of the loyalty files" of a former Treasury employee. The Staff Director, Robert Morris, states, "We had access to certain loyalty files."

These are precedents that for the sake of American liberty cannot be allowed to stand.

"Fruit of the Poisonous Tree"

The gravity of his actions is not lost on Mr. Brownell. He declares in justification of his revelations that they are directed to new legislation—legislation to legalize evidence gained by wire-tapping and to circumvent the protection that the Fifth Amendment to our Constitution provides to witnesses who are reluctant to testify.

Wire-tapping first became an issue in America when Mayor John Purroy Mitchell tapped the telephone of a Catholic priest for evidence in 1916. Within two years Congress banned the practice—but it soon crept back. In 1934, Congress set out once more to outlaw wire-tapping by Section 605 of the Federal Communications Commission Act. Wire-tapping still continued, but its use in courtrooms was banned by the Supreme Court. Evidence gained by wire-tapping, declared Mr. Justice Frankfurter, was "fruit of the poisonous tree."

In wartime the ban on wire-tapping was lifted by President Roosevelt. In cases of suspected espionage, sabotage, kidnapping and extortion it was not restored. So evidence was gained by the Department of Justice; it could not be used in court.

Disturbed by this duality, witnesses before Congress including the American Civil Liberties Union and Americans for Democratic Action have proposed that wire-tapping be legalized for espionage and sabotage, with the safeguard that authority to tap wires must be obtained from the courts. These safeguards follow the practice

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in states including New York where wire-tapping is legal under similar conditions. The New York State Bar Association concluded in a recent study that since wire-tapping was legalized, "the right to be secure against unreasonable interceptions conferred by the New York Constitution and statutes is a hollow right in the present status of the law."

When Mr. Brownell's bill was introduced in Congress it was pleaded by Deputy Attorney General William P. Rogers. Mr. Rogers opposed giving any restraining power to the courts. He opposed any definition of the crimes that wire-tapping was to be used to combat:

> It may turn out when you go to trial that it won't be for espionage . . . it will be . . . for arson [or inciting to riot]. It will be clear that it involves the national security or defense, but it may be in case of legal technicalities your proof doesn't measure up to that . . . I hate to limit it to any particular crimes.

The second stated objective of Mr. Brownell's campaign is to secure legislation that circumvents the Fifth Amendment to our Constitution. That was presented to Congress in 1953 by Sen. Pat McCarran. Essentially the bill provides that Congress with the acquiescence of the Attorney General can promise a witness that his testimony will not lead to prosecution in federal courts; then by giving the witness this much, the Congress takes from him his Constitutional right.

THE FIFTH AMENDMENT

No person shall be . . . compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation.

Nominally the bill is directed against the long line of suspected Communists who, brought before Congressional investigators, have cited their Constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. But the purpose of the bill far antedates the Communist Party. Since Roman days a struggle has continued between prosecutors whose objective is conviction and citizens whose concern is liberty. The prosecutors have sought to make husbands testify against wives and priests violate their allegiance to God. And in America they have so far failed.

There are points of detail without end in the McCarran Bill which passed the Senate last year. But the heart of it was stated by Sen. Clyde Hoey:

"We are granting to a committee of Congress the power to take away Constitutional guarantees . . ."

The *Wall Street Journal* also has dealt with the dangers in Senator McCarran's bill:

> Under such a law it would be possible for those who have committed crimes to use a Congressional investigation as an escape from accountability. For the unscrupulous it would be a temptation to connivance; for the vindictive it would be a temptation to bear witness as revenge. It is not enough to say that these abuses would be guarded against. It is enough to say that these abuses would be made possible.

Judging from Mr. Brownell's endorsement and his latest statements, this is the bill that we may expect to be passed as part of the Eisenhower program in 1954.

There are of course other measures on the agenda —matters such as agricultural production, taxes, tariffs, the welfare of our allies, the defense of the United States.

The President of the United States supposes that the enactment of his program is important. His party's high command appears to differ.

The President expresses concern for the nation's unity and good standing overseas. His party's high command could not appear less concerned.

The President expresses the hope that the Communist issue will fall into proper perspective and die away before next November. But Mr. Eisenhower apparently is no longer leader of the Republican Party. The leaders of the Party announce that the Communist issue will be *the* issue in 1954 and 1956.

It may be that from March to June Mr. Brownell will not release much from his store of secret files. From June on, as plans now stand, we can look forward to a hot time in the old town each night through November. The Department of Justice has indicated that Judith Coplon will be retried soon after the wire-tapping bill is passed. If the schedule holds, she should go to jail the last week of October. And doubtless if Mr. Brownell's advice prevails, there will be many more.

As we turn inwards in anger, bitterness and division, is it too much to hope that Russia will be more blind or weak than we are? And on the real fronts, where real battles are fought, how many nations may pass to the slavery of Soviet Communism before we get back to the important business of producing a domestic and international program for strengthening the forces of individual liberty and opposing realistically Soviet strategy for dividing and conquering the world?

It would be contemptible to suppose that common sense and decency do not still govern the American people. It would be foolish to suppose that the forces set in motion by Mr. Brownell could not get out of hand. It would be unbecoming to forget that this is not the first time that Americans have confronted and overcome such threats to their liberty.

In the 1790's conservatives were similarly aroused. They talked about Jacobinism—they acted against Jeffersonianism. They tried to prevent its rise by the Alien and Sedition Acts. They controlled the Congress. They threw editors who opposed them into jail. But they didn't carry the people along. The bills didn't halt the Jeffersonians, but they did halt the Federalists. If the descendants of the Federalists of 1953 have not learned, the children of Jefferson stand unchanged.

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LITERATURE AND THE ARTS

AN EXAMINATION OF ART

by Jacques Barzun

THE CONDENSED version of André Malraux's large work on art should be a great popular success: it is a long and heavy book, relatively expensive as compared with other books, yet obviously a bargain when one considers the many fine illustrations, the superb paper, attractive print, and intellectual aura of the volume. It is an ideal

THE VOICES OF SILENCE, by André Malraux (Doubleday; $25).

Christmas present, by which I mean what we all mean, publishers especially—the sort of book that one is sure other people will want to read. The main thing is to get there first with the mustest book.

But M. Malraux's work possesses other than physical and visual properties. It presents a thesis, or something very close to it, and it represents a great deal of effort spent in collecting and commenting upon some 400 illustrations (15 in color) that range from an Aztec rock-crystal skull to a Joan Miro ceramic. The thesis-commentary originally filled three volumes, which impressed the critics while discouraging the so-called lay reader. So more work went into the tasks of revision and excision, until today it can be affirmed that given a fair chance *The Voices of Silence* will speak to everyone of those whose unexpected favor makes a best seller.

The doctrine of the book should appeal for two main reasons. The first is that it is a very serious consideration of a subject that modern peoples in the last fifty years have come to take very seriously indeed—a matter of national concern: Art. Have we any art? Is our art good? Is it as good as the normal curve for our position in time and space indicates? If not, why not? And anyway, what *is* Art?

In the second place, the tone of M. Malraux's discussion is at once sociophilosophical and debunking. Though not always easy to grasp in its rejections and dismissals, the doctrine strongly suggests that much was wrong with the nineteenth century's view of art and much is wrong with corresponding ideas held today. The author is careful not to be quite of one mind about the way art *should* be taken. On the one hand it should not be contemplated as an object of art—that is passé with Roger Fry and Clive Bell. Art has meaning; and art should be a working part of our environment. On the other hand, meaning has its dangers, notably story-telling. Works of painting and sculpture tell no tales, not even about our emotions, our faith, or our world: they are independent worlds. This shift from here to there doesn't matter because—well, because the whole subject is shifty and the variation on it is spread out very thin over the whole extent of the discussion. At any one point some existing opinion is being molested, brushed aside, shown up, by a contemptuous epigram or an argument in the form of a difficult allusion—both equally reassuring in that they never threaten to develop into a piece of reasoning.

For example: "A glorious sunset, in painting, is not a beautiful sunset, but a great painter's sunset; just as a fine portrait is not necessarily the portrait of a beautiful face. There is more of Pascal's 'great darkness' in some of Rembrandt's faces than in all the night-pieces." Who does not feel that the difficult problem of the relation between "subject" and "art" has been masterfully disposed of, and that the references to Pascal and Rembrandt do supply the right kind of darkness?

Should the reader want more light, he can find it above, below. "If," says M. Malraux "it happens that an artist immortalizes some supreme moment, he does not do this by reproducing it, but because he subjects it to a metamorphosis." What kind of metamorphosis? Just flip back a hundred and fifty pages where we declared quite apropos: "the crucial discovery was made that, in order to become painting, the universe seen by the artist had to become a private one, created by himself." There's your metamorphosis. The discovery took place, judging by the context, around the time of Tintoretto, Raphael, and the like. Pity their predecessors, and take to heart this definitive aphorism: "To the question, 'What is art?' we answer: 'That whereby forms are transmuted into style.'"

Like the tone and the extensive reference, the doctrine brings comfort all the way through. Having decided what art is, we are ready for a long chapter on "The Creative Process," wherein we learn that this process, in many ways mysterious, begins in imitation. All art comes out of other art, for "no man can build on the void." And though we have to assume that in the beginning was the void, we may be sure that it was filled by leaning on those who began filling it. So-called primitive art is the product of a long tradition: look at it and you will see, for in the light of our principle, how else could it get so far? As for naïve art, it does not come from naïveté but from a tradition of naïveté. Nobody was so naïve naïvely. In short, there is no beginning to art: it belongs with Kant's other antinomies, whereby the world had and had not a point of origin in time. This is a great advantage in criticism, for one can swing the club of Tradition over an artist's head when he adopts (as all but one's favorites do) the wrong one.

Though our author is too modest to say so, this thesis itself is solidly traditional. Didn't the Greeks make Mnemosyne or memory the mother of all the muses? It's in the French tradition too. The philosopher Alain made the influences of art upon art a cornerstone of his *Système des Beaux-Arts* (1920). The odd thing is that we should still mean by "creation" the putting forth of something new, and that in earthly space and time there should be so many radically different forms, styles, and intentions receivable as art. Convention is a lovely thing but she ages fast—not to mention that she doesn't get along well with M. Malraux's other close friend, Styles: "Thus styles are *significations*, they impose a *meaning* on visual experience . . . every style in fact creates its own universe. . . . Never has a great artist made himself the equal of another

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great artist by deliberately modifying his art, by imposing a thought-out stylization on what was initially an emotive drive, or vice-versa."

But it would be to diminish the value this book will have for general conversation to try to reduce it to a consistent monologue. The voices of silence are many and not so mute as they are painted, which is to say that the promise of the cleverly inappropriate title is more than carried out. On every page some discovery blithely shouted from right or left protects us from the monotony of the straight path. It is like finding gems by the handful, and it begets the same insouciance in the finder as in the scatterer: "What common link existed between a 'Venus' which *was* Venus, a crucifix which *was* Christ crucified, and a bust? Shall we tell this to Maecenas or go on to the rationale of a Greek nude? It expresses sensual pleasure, we hear, "above all

because the hieratic order of the firmament . . . has ceased to be fatalistic and has changed to harmony; and because Mother Earth has included, in her conquest of what was once the awe-inspiring realm of the Mothers, the cosmos too."

The shade of Elie Faure seems to have presided over many such happy formulations: "Though Asiatic, Buddhism is not Oriental . . . had nothing of the oriental's groveling before a fear-compelling Presence." Cross off Buddhism from among oriental religions—it's merely Asiatic; and the fear-compelled are unknown this side of Hellespont. These questions of transit remind one of the Fayum artists who "in the process of transforming the Latin portrait . . .discovered that the portrait (under Roman influence) had totally lost contact with the other world." And only a hundred pages away, but unremarked, is the modern loss of contact: "To realize his *Portrait of Clemenceau* Manet, greatly daring, had to be everything in the portrait, Clemenceau next to nothing."

But why go on enumerating beauties? One cannot always be agape; the most spellbound reader returns to his senses and feels moved to ask a few questions not verbalized first by the ever-fluent, ever-flowing author. For instance, whether the myriad generalities born of such a long look at painting and sculpture are true of all art, and whether the beholder of any art may be assumed to be a fixed element, an economic man seeking the greatest pleasure through the heaviest discharge of style. Our author says: "The fact of being a clarinet player does not involve a special manner of appreciating music." But has he faithfully interviewed a sampling of clarinetists? Again, one asks whether the work of art—be it Venus *toute entière* or a fraction of Clemenceau—stays put with the passage of time, not only as a physical object but also as a spiritual one. It is hinted that our Greek nude loses its sensuality when seen with Hindu eyes. What a Hindu can do, cannot other men do, aided by time? Time is as deceptively used in these pages as pictures and facts. Thanks to slippery chronology, it is a perpetual enchantment: it is Maya.

Finally, when fully awake, one wonders why the translator of such a perfectly difficult book has made all but one word into excellent modern English. That one word is "preconize" and it recurs often, for it is common in journalistic French. You will find the English form in Webster, where it is defined as "proclaim publicly, cry up." But the meaning intended by M. Malraux in his book is simpler still: it means "advocate, urge"—as I urge all those possessed of a twenty-five dollar bill to go and buy *The Voices of Silence*.

DAY TO DAY STATESMAN

THE FIRST nine years of the nineteenth century may seem placid to the troubled atomic age, and one might unguardedly imagine that the United States enjoyed some spontaneous play in its childhood. Mr. Brant's volume—the fourth in a five-volume biography of Madison and undoubtedly the best study of him as Secretary of State—will rob readers of this pleasant conceit. Mr. Brant makes use of extensive journals, diplomatic and private correspondence; he provides new and important information obtained through the decoding of ciphers in the Madison-Monroe and Madison-Livingston correspondence; and he propounds a new conception of Madison as a courageous, far-sighted, even brilliant Secretary of State during a period of labyrinthine difficulties.

JAMES MADISON: *Secretary of State, 1800-1809*, by Irving Brant (Bobbs-Merrill; $6).

Take, for example that felicitous event by which we tend to think America wildly expanded her territory overnight—the Louisiana purchase. As Mr. Brant carefully reconstructs the day-to-day statesmanship of Madison and Jefferson, as well as the activities of our representatives abroad, we see a disquieting picture of indefatigable labor, high principle, low bargaining, decision and revision. The same road that led to the purchase, also led to the complex strategy of trying to acquire the Floridas. This attempt did not reach conclusion in the years encompassed here because of the urgent need to devise measures to keep this unprepared country out of the vortex of the Napoleonic wars. Mr. Brant then shows that those awkward and unpopular measures —the nonintercourse act and embargo law — were worthwhile experiments "short of war" and created a set of conditions that even modern Americans will find suggestive. Commercial and maritime groups in the United States found it insufferable to abide by the Embargo; new manufacturing plants mushroomed; and the Jeffersonian Party began to part at the seams. In this unhappy house, Madison became master, and moved from "the highest appointive office in the land to the highest elective office."

In presenting his material, Mr. Brant effectively takes issue with the unfair

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view of Henry Adams that Madison was a timid, second-rate, shifty-eyed, weakling. Brant is not the first scholar to reappraise Madison's role and to link him with Jefferson a co-ordinate and peer. But he is the first to attribute practically every major policy and measure of Jefferson's administration to his clear-sighted Secretary of State. In one case, Mr. Brant credits Madison with the origination of the Embargo, even though, three pages earlier, he concedes that Jefferson too considered commercial retaliation a substitute for war. The evidence, in short, establishes their collaboration on this important issue, not a single origination of it by Madison.

In another case, Mr. Brant, who usually puts no stock in the statements of certain Federalist extremists, appeals to their judgment in contending that Jefferson was unwilling to let others know that he "took advice" and that Madison, in his modesty, failed to claim credit—two chronic tendencies that the author believes result in "the long-unchallenged historical verdict that Jefferson ran everything in his administration." It is easy to huff and puff at that absurd contention; but it is no help to give us, instead, a picture of Madison as the man who *really* ran everything. This is a vexing element in a work that is a valuable service to a statesman who had not gotten his full share of credit in American history.

Mr. Brant, in presenting Madison, confines his attention to overt political acts, to specific problems of organization, to outward procedures, to that institutional and external phase of "civilization" that has to do with the march of political events and with administrative history. Concentration on such specifically political material makes possible some vivid and significant chapters—such as the brisk and forceful treatment of Burr's treason plots, and Jefferson's and Madison's important decision not to submit to the subpoena of Chief Justice Marshall in that trial. In general, the method employed throughout this biography may be called the blow-by-blow technique, involving the vast accumulation of detailed political maneuvers and exact chronological development.

This method, however, fails to catch the more intangible and personal elements, and provides scant treatment of political ideas and principles. To be sure, James Madison is hard to capture as a person and as a political philosopher. He had scrupulous control over self-display and a style of writing that lacks the lustre of Jefferson's. Nonetheless, he was the "great little Mr. Madison" and he was Jefferson's collaborator in the most influential formulation of democratic philosophy in the modern world.

ADRIENNE KOCH

TIRED TITANS

IN THE HISTORY and the folklore of our past, the businessman is a giant figure, and, after brief eclipse by politicians and professors, he promises to dominate the present as well. Toward so large a cultural phenomenon, every articulate person must formulate an attitude. Since the articulate disagree, their opinions of the businesman have ranged from love

AGE OF THE MOGULS, by Stewart H. Holbrook (Doubleday; $5).

to loathing. Half a century ago Veblen's mordant satire, Tarbell's and Lawson's documented exposes, and the writings of lesser men and women familiarized Americans with the less savory characteristics of their heroes.

During the 1930s, Matthew Josephson's *Robber Barons* and Frederick Lewis Allen's *Lords of Creation* reemphasized some of these same facts. Such writers of social history as Cleveland Amory and Lloyd Morris showed us who the rich were, how they lived, and how their new wealth tempted them to fresh extravagances of taste and to novel gaucheries of manners. More recently, historical emphasis has shifted to the positive achievements of these vigorous Americans, as in Allan Nevins' scholarly rehabilitation of the first John D. Rockefeller.

Building almost entirely with the materials assembled by his predecessors, Mr. Holbrook has constructed a composite image of the American business man. Unlike earlier writers, he specializes neither by period, nor by industry, nor by personality. His story of the du Ponts begins in the eighteenth century, while his account of Henry Ford ends in the 1940s. Mining, manufacturing, transportation and finance have their place and dozens of characters crowd these pages. If we take the title literally, the *Age of the Moguls* is almost our entire history as a nation.

Is it possible to write a dull book about men and events so fascinating? Mr. Holbrook has accomplished the difficult: this is a tiresome and unilluminating book. It includes all the anecdotes about Commodore Vanderbilt, Daniel Drew, Jay Gould, J. P. Morgan, and Henry Ford. Repeatedly its author exclaims upon the rugged individualism of his heroes, but in bulk the anecdotal approach to history has this fatal disadvantage: it reduces each character to the level of anecdote. Every now and then the reader will stop and ask himself was it Daniel Drew who was sly or was that Jay Gould? Was it Frick who was sanctimonious or Elbert Gary? The further question must intrude: Who cares? This is a poor way to understand the industrial and financial history of the last century.

But it is the only avenue offered us: the only unity of this ill-organized study derives from the fact that all of its characters are rich. It is as if Mr. Holbrook sat down and decided one day to write a book which neglected not a single entertaining antic of this fortunate group. In fairness, it should be said that a certain amount of information about financial and industrial manipulation does appear, just enough to tantalize the reader and to heighten his expectation of ultimate enlightenment. It is true, also, that every now and then Mr. Holbrook approaches the very verge of assessing his subjects as historical phenomena. He never lingers.

ROBERT LEKACHMAN

A POPULIST PROGRESSIVE

DAVID RIESMAN of the University of Chicago is uniquely well-equipped to write a critical analysis of Thorstein Veblen. Like Veblen, Riesman works in many disciplines, ranging from history, political science and law to sociology and psychology. His psychological insights are especially valuable in his analysis of Veblen.

THORSTEIN VEBLEN, by David Riesman (Scribner's; $3).

Riesman makes clear at the very outset that he is not a devotee of Veblen. "I find him," he writes, "more often interesting than attractive, more often pungent than wise." Nevertheless, he writes sympathetically, and is quick to note the intellectual achievements of

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this strange and unusual man, as well as his shortcomings.

Veblen was a man of strong likes and dislikes. He hated, or disliked, or disapproved of businessmen, bankers, speculators, lawyers, corporate financiers, salesmen, the aristocrats of the labor movement, menial servants, college presidents and trustees, nationalism, central government, country towns, trusts and monopolies, Germans, reform and enthusiasm, the income tax the national debt, government protection of foreign investors, "natural rights," and waste.

On the other hand, Veblen approved of or admired, in various ways and degrees, engineers, skilled workmen, the common man, the downtrodden, farmers, immigrants, the Wobblies, socialism, simple dress, handicrafts, small rather than big affairs, Karl Marx, William Graham Sumner, primitive tribes, women and cats.

Central in his thinking was the conflict he saw between industry and business, or between engineers and the price system, or between workmanship and wastemanship. Industry and engineers are interested in the production of goods, businessmen in pecuniary gain. The spirit of American business, said Veblen, was "a spirit of quietism, caution, compromise, collusion, and chicane." As Riesman notes, this conflict was an obsession with Veblen.

Some of Riesman's most illuminating observations deal with the analysis of personality. Above all, Veblen's marginality as a second-generation Norwegian is emphasized, for he was a midwestern "norsky," alienated from the parochial culture of his parents, and not fully integrated into American life. Riesman also stresses the fact that Veblen's father was a hard, domineering man, whereas his mother was "a softer person, whimsical and imaginative." "Much of Veblen's work may be read as an internalized colloquy between his parents."

A dominant theme in Veblen's life, Riesman believes, was the fear of constraint, even of his own system of ideas reflected, for example, in his praise of "masterless men" and his concept of "idle curiosity." Veblen is described as strongly inhibited, unconsciously conspiring in his own exploitation, incapable of fighting directly for the things he believed in, underestimating himself and hence unaware of his power to hurt others, and fearing success.

Riesman asks: "What is the source of Veblen's power over us?" Various facets of an answer are strewn throughout this book. Partly, our attraction for Veblen lies in his irony, "which permits him at once to embrace and to fend off life." Partly, the Great Depression seemed to vindicate his judgments. Veblen also had a unique talent for dramatically sharpening the conflict of good and evil by personification. Riesman believes that he contributed a new genre for social science, irony, that "the brilliant reinvention of irony as a mode of approach to theoretical questions" was more important than his intellectual contribution.

It is also noted that Veblen produced a few startling predictions, such as the potential for aggression of an industrialized Japanese feudalism, the switch to national patriotism of the Second International in World War I, the Great Depression, the military prowess of a revived German feudal system, and the refusal of the white workers to identify themselves with the factory proletariat. It is undeniable, as Riesman argues, that Veblen left his mark upon the professional economists.

Riesman believes that Veblen was one of the precursors of sociological jurisprudence, and that certainly he induced "greater semantic sophistication" in economic thinking. He did important work in developing a science of economic behavior, and in the study of such phenomena as crisis, monopoly, and the divorce between ownership and management in the corporate system. Even so, Riesman thinks Veblen's economics is "definitely dated," as in its over-emphasis of industry from pecuniary operations. He believes that there has been a change from conspicuous consumption to conspicuous production, "from blue-stocking to blue-jean."

For all his efforts at cold-blooded detachment, Veblen was, in Riesman's opinion, part of the populist-progressive movement of his times. He had many populist attitudes, such as his rural Puritanism, his empiricism, and his belief in free trade. As a cosmopolitan progressive, Veblen was shocked by the War and its aftermath, and believed in material progress, scientific enlightenment, and perpetual peace. "We may say," says Riesman, "That Veblen was a Cleveland free-trader, a Bellamy nationalist, a parlimentary Socialist, and a Bolshevik with syndicalist leanings," and that he had "a compelling sympathy with the outcast." DAVID FELLMAN

EUROPEAN ANALYSIS

THEODORE WHITE is a man of simple faith and brooding concern. Both qualities are expressed in *Fire in the Ashes*, whose twin themes are the birth of Europe and the renaissance of Germany. Inspired by the first trend, disturbed by the second he notes: "They move today in heated rivalry, each racing the other to realization; for whichever triumphs first will make the other its servant." If this is sound, then, by Mr. White's own analysis the race is one-sided. Only America and Britain, Mr. White seems to imply, can keep Europe ahead. He does not indicate how American and British influence is to be applied without alienating Europeans, or what forms our developing associations are to take.

FIRE IN THE ASHES, by Theodore White (William Sloane Associates; $5).

Mr. White's discussion of Europe is limited to three nations: France, Germany and Britain. The spectacle of French politics "fretful, whining, querulous" he attributes to inflation, the system of special privileges and "the little yellow stain of treason" in every Frenchman. He does not explain from what basic traits of character, society and tradition those evils arise. Yet France remains the heart of his hopes for Europe.

Mr. White is basically a reporter. His purpose is to simplify and dramatize, rather than to shape policy. His perception is intuitive and sharp. His writing is memorable, if sometimes forced.

Mr. White does not present the facts in support of a continuous argument. Nor does he draw any theory from the facts he presents. Because his book is narrative rather than analytical in style, it is not a substitute for analysis of Europe's problems. There are psychological problems, such as the cause and treatment of neutralism; there are political issues—the matter of Germany's Eastern frontier, and the question of whether the position of Europe this side of the Iron Curtain can be unified; above all there is the military question—can Europe be defended or treated as a base in an atomic war? The questions are barely considered in *Fire in the Ashes*. It remains a fine and important affirmation of faith in one of the few great projects of the West. M. S.

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ARRAU'S BEETHOVEN

LEARNING and playing all of Beethoven's thirty-two piano sonatas-with-opus-number is something that only a few pianists do in anybody's lifetime, and the effort itself is usually enough to establish the player as a Beethoven authority. Claudio Arrau, a great pianist whose efforts in the past have been largely devoted to works which would show him off, has now undertaken the monastic dedication of the Beethoven player, and is finishing the cycle at Town Hall. In the future, we shall no doubt hear him in the exalted role of the Beethoven interpreter.

The dramatic qualities of some of Beethoven's best works have frequently led critics to compare him with Shakespeare. The comparison still holds in the worst works of both of them. Beethoven, at his worst, is like the Shakespeare of the *Comedy of Errors* and the *Two Gentlemen of Verona.* In his piano sonatas Beethoven somewhat overplayed the vulgar vein that one sometimes finds in Shakespeare. This vulgarity is oppressive in several of the sonatas: opus 2, numbers 2 and 3; opus 10, numbers 1 and 2; opus 22 and opus 27, number 1; opus 31, number 1 and opera 54 and 79. The cheapness of these nine sonatas usually keeps them from the concert stage. Four of the remaining sonatas are easy teaching pieces, works of charm and taste, but not suited to public performance: the sonatas paired in opus 14 and again in opus 49. Arrau, like most pianists, has always neglected these thirteen sonatas, which comprise almost half of Beethoven's piano sonata literature. In addition, there are four hackneyed sonatas: the Pathetique, the Moonlight, the Waldstein and the Appassionata, which, good as they are, would profit from neglect. This leaves fifteen Beethoven piano sonatas suitable for performance now, a larger contribution to the piano sonata repertory than that of Schumann, Liszt, Brahms, Grieg, Stravinsky, Bartok and Hindemith. Which is no reason for exposing the remaining seventeen to the public.

Under the best conditions, a pianist brings to the Beethoven sonatas more than a study of the individual works. If he is an Artur Schnabel or a Solomon, he brings a transcendent sense of style. At worst, he applies only the later tradition of Chopin, Liszt, Weber and Brahms. A pianist as impregnated with later romantic views as Arrau can only caricature the Beethoven sonatas. The good sonatas are marked by the widest variations of style. Arrau has chosen to play them all alike.

Arrau is at his worst in those late pieces which have become the object of an almost superstitious awe and veneration. In order to get the most out of every golden note, he brazenly ignores Beethoven's own tempo indications, with the result that all sense of phrase is lost. Nobody has ever played the piano so slowly as Arrau does in some of these slow movements. Like Shaw's young lady, he seems to be endlessly repeating "The rain in Spain is seldom on the plain"; listening with great and obvious pleasure to the lovely tones he is producing without the slightest concern for the sequence of sounds.

It would be gratifying to say that Arrau is a good interpreter of some of the sonatas that I heard him play. The fact is that although he uses them to make himself sound good, the music, when he plays it, sounds worse than it needs to and has little of the beauty that Beethoven wrote into it. Arrau is best in the works of the middle period, but there are only four sonatas, or at most six, from this period. A Beethoven interpreter needs more. ROBERT EVETT

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

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NEW DRAMATISTS

ONE KIND of American playwright was characterized long ago in these columns by Stark Young: "bold without power and humility about the great forces of life, highly journalistic, and dipping regardless into the depths, advancing with notable facility into regions where only the progressively oblivious could ever be quite at home." Mr. Young's subject was *The Silver Cord;* this season's instance is *Ladies of the Corridor.*

But the brash type is no longer dominant; it has given place to a shy type. A playwright of the new school, when successful, seems modest, fastidious, compassionate, lyric; when unsuccessful, cagey, gauche, spineless, tongue-tied. Two recent plays are successful enough to be worth attention yet are kept from complete success by the defects of the new mode. These are *American Gothic* by Victor Wolfson and *The Trip to Bountiful* by Horton Foote.

Mr. Wolfson recounts the events that lead to the murder of a second wife by the first. The setting is a New England that recalls *Ethan Frome.* The murderess is a poor, demented creature whom we do not hate but pity. As performed by a capable group of young players in the Village, the play has a liveliness and a reality not found in the plays that producers put on uptown. But then Mr. Wolfson shies back from his climax and catastrophe like a horse approaching a precipice. Of a sudden, he seems prepared to revoke the reality of all that has passed, shrugging it off with his alibi of a title. This is just a Gothic Tale, he seems to say, take it or leave it. And we leave it.

I believe it was Tennessee Williams who brought the word Gothic into current discussion (in a sense that applies less to *The Castle of Otranto* than to *The Castle* of Kafka. In fact Mr. Williams bids fair to become, theatrically speaking, the father of his country: the new playwrights derive from him, not from O'Neill, Wilder, Odets or Miller (to name his only conceivable rivals). Mr. Wolfson is not exactly a new playwright—his *Excursion* was a hit before the war—but his new play, in the form it takes at Circle in the Square, would be inconceivable without *Streetcar* and *Summer and Smoke.* Neurotic woman is the chief exhibit of the contemporary American stage, and Mr. Wolfson does not forget to have her shouted at by a male ogre (Kowalsky) and courted by a mild-mannered rival (Mitch).

Though neurotic woman is assigned only the second-largest role in *The Trip to Bountiful,* she has no trouble moving in and taking over the show. Some of the best comic writing of recent seasons goes into her lines, but the cumulative effect of so many naturalistic details turns out, by paradox, to be pure farce; and the author's evident intentions are thwarted by his own facility. Lillian Gish, who acts the largest role in the play with a beautiful concentration and intensity, seems at many points detached —by the farce—from the play she should dominate. More crucial still, Kowalsky and Mitch are conspicuous, this time, by their absence. The man who stands between the two women—his wife and mother—is of straw. The plot, the theme, the exigencies of theatre all demand that he speak, that he explain himself, but he is maddeningly and fatally silent, pleading some fifth amendment of the dramatic constitution.

That Mr. Foote's neurotic woman is so funny and forceful must in part be attributed to Jo van Fleet who plays her. The new dramatists have brought new actresses in. Before the new dramatist speaks, the new actress has brought onstage her prime attribute: a "quality," a bizarre, neurasthenic quality. Not that it is entirely undefinable. It is defined by grimaces and quiverings of the lip, by sidelong glances, by syncopated movements of as many parts of the body as will move. The new actress cannot or will not keep still. If she has nothing else to do, she can always rub her right hand against her left forearm. She is well adapted to central staging because she keeps turning her head and looking in the other direction. Jo van Fleet is only one of her names. She has also called herself Maureen Stapleton, Geraldine Page and Clarice Blackburn.

(In fairness to Miss van Fleet I should add that, unlike some of her colleagues, she is not a mere personality, bringing only her personal quality to the footlights. An actor should not *be,* but *mean;* and we are not in doubt that Miss van Fleet finds her meanings as an artist must find them—by craftsmanship. Nonetheless, she bears the mark of her generation, and there are many roles which—for all the craftsmanship—her personality will not, at present, let her play. I thought the role of Camille in *Camino* was one last spring—unless Mr. Williams wanted to make Dumas' heroine over, and this Indian summer of Marguerite Gautier was meant as another Roman spring of Mrs. Stone.)

It is of course foolish for critics to tell writers of one school that they should go to another school. A bad writer will not turn good by mere change of address. A good writer is unlikely to need a critic's counsel. There is a futility about the criticism which offers a renascence of drama on condition that the dramatists adopt a certain method or a certain philosophy, and none of us who write criticism has always avoided making such offers. On the other hand, with the shy playwrights of today, one has the impression that there is something inside them that is prevented from coming out largely by the censorship exercised by certain current attitudes to playwriting. If there is no such thing inside them, they are scarcely worth our attention. If there is, let us break down the obstructive attitudes, destroy the censor, and see what happens.

There is a recent play which, in one respect at least, affords a corrective to the current trend of shy, sensitive, structureless atmospheric playwriting. This is T. S. Eliot's *The Confidential Clerk.* It has a plot. Not just a story but the old, arranged, constructed, wire-drawn, and infinitely maligned article. If you have conceded anything to the "new" drama—of which one of the cardinal shynesses is shyness of plot (see Van Druten's *Playwright at Work*)—you will quickly take it back again at the first reminder of what a real plot can be. And if you have no access to *The Confidential Clerk,* the last act of *A Doll's House* will do just as well. ERIC BENTLEY

Notes on the Critics

JACQUES BARZUN'S next book will be a study of Berlioz. ADRIENNE KOCH is the author of *Jefferson and Madison: the Great Collaboration.* DAVID FELLMAN teaches at the University of Wisconsin. ROBERT LEKACHMAN is on the faculty of Barnard College.

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From Our Readers

► Cattleman's Caravan

Ye gods! When will T.R.B. disabuse himself of his uninformed or *mis*-informed conception of the farm problem?

He states (*NR*, Nov. 9), "Cattlemen made a big show in Washington but only partly won our sympathy, they are the same crowd who ended—price controls."

The "Cattleman's Caravan" which took a group of 350 farmers and ranchers to Washington to talk over the serious price drop in cattle, was sponsored by the National Farmers Union, an organization dedicated to the business of protecting small farmers and ranchers from economic hardship.

It has designated as the family-type farm those who live on the land and do all the work connected with its operation, in contrast to absentee ownership, "suitcase" farmers and corporation farmers who live on main street and operate exclusively with hired help.

These family-type farmers and ranchers are people who own small units of production and are at the mercy of a "boom or bust" economy. They are people who have no control over price fixing or the power to stage the often referred to "meat strike." Most of them practice diversification and own small farms and a few cattle. Some of them do no grain farming but depend on a small herd of cattle for their entire income.

Ten of the cattlemen who made up the caravan were Montana farmers, living on the "dry lands" and running a small herd under the Taylor Grazing Act which discriminates against the small rancher. These cattlemen are all but "busted" since the price drop, which has been accompanied by rising costs of production. They are in the same predicament that small business was in during the 30s. They are the core and stability of our agricultural economy.

The big corporation ranchers are in a position to take advantage of the price drop to expand their holdings and seem to favor Secretary Ezra Taft Benson's "hands-off" policy of, "Let the farmer rely on his own beef and brawn and recover his lost manhood."

I suggest that T.R.B. take time out to acquaint himself with this segment of our population and their problems, who do not have eight hour days but work from daylight to dark in order to have the same standard of living as city people have.

Hinsdale, Mont. MARIE EATON

► Reinhold Niebuhr

I have a belated question regarding Reinhold Niebuhr's excellent article "Liberals and the Marxist Heresy" in your Oct. 12 issue. In the way of developing his thesis, with which I am in strong agreement, he states that "all the errors of the rightist dogma could not efface its one virtue: preserving a multiplicity of power centers." Is that quite accurate?

Is not the natural tendency of the business interests in a society living under the Dogma of the Right to coagulate into a monopoly? When this happens, the effort is made to wipe out other power centers. In this situation, the Right does not seek to reduce the power of the state except as it interferes with its own interests, but rather seeks to use the power of the state for its own ends (tax amortization, tidelands bill, tax cuts at the "top," control of FCC, etc.). This theory is further corroborated by the effort of the Right now in power to eliminate its opposition (McCarthyism at its crudest level, firing of career government employees at the other end of the scale, etc.). According to this reading of the situation, the end result of the righest dogma, when in operation, is the *destruction* of the multiplicity of power centers.

As I have read the facts, the extent to which we in America have avoided the totalitarian state is not due to the rightist dogma, but to the New Deal philosophy, which is hardly close to the Right.

Plainview, Tex. GEORGE SMALL

► Freedom to Destroy

Your article on British Guiana in the issue of Nov. 9 is both stimulating and disquieting. You take for granted that the People's Progressive Party is beyond question a Communist conspiracy, and you fail to make any consideration of the obvious and vitally important question of the legitimacy of revoking a democratic constitution.

On the first point, alternative explanations (as reported by the *Manchester Guardian Weekly* on Oct. 29) of some plausibility appear to have been offered by Messrs. Jagan and Burnham to British reporters in London. This is however a point of fact on which further investigation may be able to cast some light.

The more fundamental question concerns the very essence of democracy. Does an external authority have a moral right, under democratic philosophy, of preventing a people from adopting a form of government which will ultimately destroy democracy in the liberal Western sense of the word? If so, what are the fuller implications of this principle? We are forced to face the unpleasant fact that under some conditions democracy is quite capable of destroying itself; under what conditions may a superior force, championing that same democracy, suspend it in order to preserve its long-run chances? How, for example, would our principles apply to the government of the Union of South Africa, which is suppressing both freedom and democracy in our sense, and presumably paving the way for an impossible situation in which violent revolution may come to appear the only reasonable alternative?

These questions are not ephemeral, but basic. Our answers will necessarily have considerable influence on our own attitude toward further problems which will almost inevitably arise in the course of the break-up of colonial empires.

Denver, Colo. CECIL FRANKLIN

► Pioneering to Tyranny

The resumé, given by Leo Muray in the Nov. 2 issue of the *New Republic*, of Robert Jungk's *The Future Has Already Begun* struck a note which found a strong echo in my mind, made up yet as to whether Mr. Jungk or his critic is right. In conversations with people from many different walks of life I have so far gotten the frightening impression that today there exists among a large part of the American people a lethal indifference to ideas and issues in which they are not themselves involved directly and materially. At elections, one allows oneself to

(Continued on page 23)

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To Our Readers

The first choice of Gerald Johnson, Max Lerner and myself in the *New Republic's* Political Book Club is Franz Borkenau's *European Communism.* It is not an easy book to read. Many chapters, on the Spanish Civil War and the Grand Alliance are painful as they review in the light of all that is known now, the undercover course of the Communist Party in the major endeavors of the last 30 years.

Yet *European Communism* is an important book. Borkenau writes with all the understanding of a former Communist Party leader but none of the obsessive bitterness of one still held in the Party's grip. Now, when false scapegoats are punished, and great issues vulgarized, it is useful to be reminded that the Communist Parties of Europe are powerful movements, strongly supported, ably led, and trained to move back into command in the world battles of 1954, while Americans war among themselves over those of 1945.

And surely war is not too strong a word for the campaign launched by Mr. Brownell. It was like Pearl Harbor in its impact and portent for the future.

For me, from the opening stages of the campaign, these categories stand out:

Most reprehensible: The Attorney General, of course—his charge is without parallel and cannot be withdrawn or explained or excused.

Most praiseworthy: The Washington reporters, and above all those of the *New York Times*—all of them insisted doggedly on separating charges and facts.

Most disappointing: The editorial writers—with few exceptions they failed to rise to the occasion, or else, as in the case of the *Washington Post,* collapsed.

Most foolish: Mr. Truman's advisers—their advance tip that Mr. Truman would hold J. Edgar Hoover partly responsible for his decision to transfer Harry White was the break that Senator Jenner seized on, in inducing the FBI Director to testify.

The strangest comment: The *Nation*—it implies that the events which the country is debating are beneath consideration because the witnesses who have described their actions as one-time Communists are one-time Communists!

The finest aside: Winston Churchill—in installment 27 of *Triumph and Tragedy* he records a dispute with President Truman over Germany. Instead of blaming the President he notes the context of the President's action and concludes: *"Those who are only wise after the event should hold their peace."*

m. s.

LETTERS

(Continued from page 22)

be dragged down to the polls in a courtesy car to get the cumbersome business of voting over with (many of the 60 percent of 170 million illiterate Indian villagers traveled on foot for days to get to the polls in their first general elections), and the rest of the time government is left up to the politicians.

The eyes of the world are upon America—hers is a grave responsibility. If she fails, world leadership will ultimately go to a worthier people. If the third major dictatorship of modern history—that of industry—should arise in this land of the free, the people will have deserved every bit of it. If we don't take upon ourselves our responsibilities 1984 may not quite be 30 years away.

Baltimore, Md. LOUIS G. HOFFMANN

► Who Is Buried in Grant's Tomb?

A friend, formerly an ardent admirer of Eisenhower, now wishes he could get on Groucho Marx's program, so that when he asks "Who is buried in Grant's tomb?" he can reply "Eisenhower."

Los Angeles, Calif. LILY DALEY

► Sabotage?

A confusing and regrettable printing error has sneaked into your editorial "Dogs Rats—and Now, Men" of Nov. 9, 1953:

"The lesson surely is that we must NOT, by our own actions, bring about the objective which the Russians tortured our pilots to achieve."

The "not" was omitted. Could it be that Russian agents are hiding behind your linotype machines and have been tampering with the matrix to achieve their devious ends? This should be brought to the attention of Attorney General Brownell . . .

Berkeley, Calif. WALTER GERSTEL

Bandwagon

European tennis stars are temperamental, have bad manners on the court and should take more care of their personal appearance, Norman Brooks, secretary of the Northern California Tennis Association said today. . . .

Brooks said that they do not have the competitive spirit that characterizes the play of the Americans—they play more for the fun of it. – *United Press dispatch, October 20, 1953.*

This may be the end of a trend of declining popularity and growing suspicion of the State Department—a trend partly due to the fact that it has never dealt directly with Americans but always with foreigners and hence was subject to mistrust. – *Communication from Rep. DeWitt S. Hyde (R, Md.) to his constituents.*

A Washington socialite who played a leading role in planning the big inaugural show for President Eisenhower last January was indicted today on charges of lying when he denied trying to peddle influence for a fee. . . .

When Stephenson changed his testimony and admitted he tried to make such an arrangement with the firm, Representative Hardy, Democrat, Virginia, called the witness "one of the biggest liars I have ever listened to."

Stephenson protested that Hardy "took in too much territory."

"I know darn well that I am not the biggest liar," Stephenson said. — *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, November 17, 1953.*

This is not merely the isolated case of the mysterious Harry Dexter White. It is the first of a series of revelations which the Eisenhower Administration is about to make as its first politically positive action since it took office last January. – *From John O'Donnell column in New York Daily News, November 9, 1953.*

Mrs. Amy Spencer [Eugene, Ore.] said passage of the resolution for a high federal dam at Hell's Canyon would constitute a grave mistake in going against the Administration on so basic an issue and that it would be particularly bad to get in the bad graces of the state Republican Central Committee when the finances of the Young Republicans are so shaky. The resolution was voted down, 79 to 36. – *The Oregon Journal, Nov. 15, 1953.*

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

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